

# **Returning Deliberative Democracy to Athens: Deliberative Polling for Candidate Selection<sup>1</sup>**

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All over the world, political parties face the issue of whether or not their methods of selecting candidates are suitably democratic. In the US, the reform of candidate selection has long been a major preoccupation, particularly in the Progressive period and again following the McGovern Fraser Commission in the 1970s. These two waves of reform led to the current dominance of the mass primary as a means of candidate selection in the US, not only for the highly visible presidential primary process but also for many other offices in states around the country. By contrast, candidate selection outside the US has generally lacked transparency to the point that it was dubbed “the secret garden of politics” two decades ago in a landmark study (Gallagher and Marsh 1988). But in the time since there has been more experimentation with democratizing candidate selection, particularly in Western Europe (see Hopkin, 2001; Pennings and Hazan 2001; Bille, 2001).

Candidate selection processes come down to some basic choices. They can be classified in terms of whether the selectorate (the decision making group) is elite or mass, and whether it is open or closed. Mass primaries constitute the most prominent form of mass consultation. They can be either open or closed (open to members of any party or closed so that only party members can vote). The exact nature of elite candidate selection processes vary (for example, in the degree of centralization or hierarachy.) But so long as elites are making the decision they are almost certainly party members.<sup>2</sup>

Hence, there are effectively three basic possibilities, elite party processes or mass processes that may be open or closed. Of course there can be mixed forms (elite committees nominating candidates who in turn are voted on in primaries) but we can focus on these three basic options in order to situate the project reported on here.

### **Candidate Selection and Democratic Theory**

Consider two fundamental democratic values: political equality and deliberation. We can roughly think of political equality as a value whereby each voter in a population has his or her preferences considered to the same degree in the process (perhaps equal voting power or an equal chance of being the decisive voter). Deliberation is a value that requires participants to become more informed about competing arguments and to weigh them on their merits.

Whether a selection process is open or closed, there appears to be a basic dilemma facing reforms of candidate selection: elite selectorates violate political equality while mass selectorates tend to violate deliberation. We seem to have a forced choice between politically equal but relatively non-deliberative masses or politically unequal but relatively more deliberative elites. The first horn of the apparent dilemma comes from the fact that if elites make the choice, then political equality is undermined. Of course, technically American presidential primaries involve a mass decision in which elites (delegates) are empowered to officially decide at the party convention. Hence in theory the presidential nomination system relies on a split process in which the mass public votes and then the elites who are selected vote. Other mixed forms are possible. But if we focus on where the decision is effectively (rather than officially) made, then the mass

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<sup>2</sup> Hence while there are in theory four possibilities, elite closed, elite open, mass closed and mass open, the elite open possibility is an empty category.

primary puts the locus of decision firmly at the mass level. Delegates are committed by the primary process and their votes at the convention are almost always a formality.

To the extent that the mass public fails to become informed or to seriously engage the issues, there is a sacrifice in deliberation. To the extent that elites can autonomously decide without having to defer to a decision by the people, then there is a sacrifice in political equality. Is it possible to combine deliberation and political equality, to combine a thoughtful and informed engagement with the issues, usually more typical of elites, with a mechanism that employs an actual decision by members of the mass public?

In theory there is a solution to this problem with an ancient pedigree. In ancient Athens, deliberative microcosms chosen by lot made a number of important public decisions. The law courts with juries of 500 or more selected by lot would deliberate for a day and then vote. The *nomothetai*, or legislative commissions chosen in the same way would make the final decisions on some legislation. The *graphe paronomon* would allow trials by a randomly selected microcosm of those who made illegal proposals in the Assembly. The threat that this process might be invoked may have provided incentives for the debates in the Assembly to be more responsible. But many of these deliberative microcosms chosen by lot were not very deliberative. The 500 would sit in an amphitheatre for a day and hear opposing arguments and then vote. But there was no small group discussion and no interaction between the jury and those presenting the case. A more ambitious precedent was the Council of 500 which was also randomly selected but which met for a year and had alternating groups from each tribe taking prime responsibility for a month. On the best available evidence, the Council involved considerable deliberation and was randomly selected from a list open to all, from among those who put themselves forward. (see Hansen, 1999 and Ober, forthcoming)

This form of democracy, the deliberative microcosm chosen by lot, can in theory combine both political equality and deliberation. Every citizen has an equal random chance of being chosen<sup>3</sup> and in that sense, an equal random chance of being the decisive voter in the resulting decision processes. The process itself can also embody political equality, depending on the way the discussions are conducted and the opinions are solicited at the end. Also, depending on the nature and degree of the interactions among the participants, it is plausible to envisage the process as deliberative—competing arguments are weighed on the merits and the participants become more informed.

A modern variant, Deliberative Polling, is an attempt to realize the same basic idea—a randomly selected microcosm that deliberates about important public issues. The deliberations, the sampling, and the outreach to the rest of the public can all be improved in comparison to ancient practice (see Fishkin, 1991; Fishkin and Luskin 2005). The modern version incorporates small group discussions and dialogue with panels of competing experts to facilitate deliberation. It also builds on modern public opinion research to get as good a sample as possible and to capture the effects of deliberation before and after. And the media permit outreach to the rest of the citizenry so that the reasons which weigh in the deliberative process can be widely shared.

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<sup>3</sup> In Ancient Athens there was an additional step in that the lottery was conducted among those who agreed to have their names on the list of citizens who were drawn into service on juries and on the other institutions described here.

## **The Marousi Project**

The project reported on here is a first effort to apply Deliberative Polling to an official process of candidate selection. It also happens to mark the return of a variant of Athenian democracy to Athens--but after a gap of 2,400 years.

Under the leadership of George Papandreou, one of Greece's two main political parties, PASOK (the Panhellenic Socialist Movement), decided to apply Deliberative Polling to the selection of its candidate for mayor of Marousi, a large municipality in the Athens metropolitan area (and the site of the 2004 Olympics). While the initial intention of the organizers was to provide advisory input to the party, the project ended up constituting the official decision. Hence the usual end point of a Deliberative Poll, the final questionnaire, was followed by actual voting in a polling booth with secret ballots by the sample of deliberators.

The project aspired to implement two fundamental values to the problem of candidate selection—political equality and deliberation. An important indicator of political equality is the representativeness of the sample. Every voter in the population should have an equal chance of being in the sample and since the opinions of the sample are weighed equally, an equal chance, in theory, of being the decisive voter. Of course, no actual “random sample” is perfect. Every voter drawn in the sample is not reached, some of those reached choose not to take the initial interview, many of those who take the initial interview choose not to attend. We approach the representativeness question here by comparing participants and non-participants both for the electorate as a whole and for PASOK voters in particular.

The second value, deliberation, can be studied in a variety of ways. But a central claim is that the participants become more informed and that those who become more informed are the ones who tend to change their views. In that sense the final considered opinions do not just happen to be different. They can be shown to be driven by a process of discussion in which people become more informed. Here we can take information effects as an important indicator of deliberative quality, while admitting that there are a variety of other important indicators.<sup>4</sup>

### **Representativeness**

Marousi is a large municipality in the Athens metropolitan area with a population of around 70,000. Should the deliberators choosing the candidate for PASOK be drawn from any voters in Marousi or just party members?

PASOK leader George Papandreou decided that it would be most appropriate to sample all voters as a symbol of the party's openness to the whole population. However, we realized that party members would naturally be more interested. Hence there are really two ways of thinking about the Deliberative Poll (DP) here—the degree to which it is representative of the whole electorate and the degree to which it is representative of party members.

The sample was recruited after an initial telephone survey of 1,275 eligible voters. Only after the initial survey were respondents invited to the event. Out of 1,275, 153 people attended and completed a second questionnaire upon arrival at the Polling site.

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<sup>4</sup> See for example, Luskin, Fishkin and Hahn (2007). Also, Alice Siu has looked at argument quality by categorizing arguments offered during the deliberations themselves (Siu 2008).

Finally, 138 people completed the post deliberation questionnaire at the end of the day. There were ten hours of dialogue, in alternating small groups and plenary sessions with the nine candidates. After the first questionnaire, but before their arrival on the day, respondents were sent briefing materials on nineteen local issues. These briefing materials were developed by the organizing committee for the whole project, led by Professor John Panaretos.

#### *Participants vs. Non-participants: All Voters*

There were some key demographic differences between participants and non-participants. Most obviously, the event attracted far more voters who were PASOK supporters. 67.9% of participants but only 27.6% of non-participants voted for PASOK in the 2004 elections. This difference was predictable since this project differed from previous Deliberative Polls in not offering a financial incentive for participation. Usually honorariums are offered as a gesture of appreciation. In this case, financial payments were thought to be controversial in the Greek political context. Instead, the party made clear at the outset that the party was offering the participants an opportunity to make an important decision—the choice of PASOK’s candidate. However, this incentive, a share in the decision, was naturally of greater interest to PASOK supporters.

There were several other demographic differences between participants and non-participants. Participants included fewer women and fewer housewives. Participants were slightly older in age, but slightly more participants were students compared to non-participants. In terms of marital status, fewer participants were single without children, but participants had slightly more children than non-participants. Participants also had a slightly higher income and attended church less regularly than non-participants.

Despite these demographic differences, the issue priorities of participants and non-participants were quite similar. Out of nineteen issues, participants and non-participants only significantly differed on three issues. The three issues were “integration of immigrants into society”, “managing school budgets”, and “instituting a private university in Marousi”. The participants thought the first was somewhat more important and the latter two less important. In each case the difference is a fraction of a point on an eleven (0 to 10) point scale.

(insert Table 1 about here)

#### *Participants vs. Non-Participants : Pasok Voters*

As noted earlier, there are two ways of thinking about the sample gathered in Marousi. First, does it offer a good microcosm of all voters? Second, does it offer a good microcosm of party supporters? Out of 1,275 people who completed an initial questionnaire, 414 people voted for Pasok in the 2004 election and could thus be considered PASOK supporters. Of these 414 people, 310 were non-participants and 104 were participants. Of the demographic variables, only gender and housewife were significant in the comparison of PASOK participants and PASOK non-participants. In line with the above results, fewer women and fewer housewives participated. Furthermore, there were only three significant differences among issue priorities. The opinions of Pasok participants and non-participants differed on “tackling unemployment”,

“reducing poverty” and “managing school budgets”. In all three cases, the participants thought the issues were lower in priority than did non-participants and the differences were relatively small (again a fraction of a point on a 0 to 11 point scale).

(Insert Table 2 about here)

Despite the fact that no financial incentives were offered, the participants offer a good microcosm of the attitudes of the electorate on the issues—whether the relevant electorate is considered to be the population of all voters or that of party supporters. From the standpoint of democratic theory a microcosm of views on the issues is particularly important. Consider J.S. Mill’s idea that for a body to deliberate on behalf of a population, a key criterion was whether or not it offered a microcosm of the reasons or policy perspectives in that population. He called such a microcosm a “congress of opinions” (Mill, 1890). It is arguable that despite some imperfections on demographics, the sample gathered for this first candidate selection project was indeed a “congress of opinions.”

### **Deliberating About the Candidates**

During this Deliberative Poll, participants considered six candidates for Pasok party’s mayoral nomination in Marousi. In preparation for the poll, the party had narrowed the candidates to a short list of six on the grounds that six was a manageable number to consider in depth for a day’s deliberations. The candidates included: Panagiotis Alexandris, Yiannis Veloudos, Charalambos Vlachos, Mary Diakoliou, Mary Karansou and Alekos Breyiannis. The initial questionnaire of nearly 1300 people found that Alexandris was the least known of the six candidates, as 84 percent indicated they had “never heard of him” or did not answer the question. However, post-deliberations, participants’ feelings towards Alexandris received the highest feeling thermometer rating, 62.6 out of 100. In terms of change, four of six candidates had positive changes and two candidates, Veloudos and Vlachos, experienced a slight decrease. All four candidates with positive changes had statistically significant changes as well, but Alexandris had by far the greatest increases. In the analyses that follow we will use these thermometer ratings as the dependent variable since all participants were asked to rate all candidates. Later we will turn to voting intention as revealed by the balloting.  
(Insert Table 3 about here)

### **Information**

In addition to questions about the candidates there were three categories of information questions: factual questions about the issues, position placements of parties and candidates on a left/right scale, and placements of candidates on various issue scales. Participants’ knowledge in all three categories increased significantly.

There were seven factual knowledge questions in this Poll. The factual multiple choice questions included Marousi’s population, number of stores in “The Mall”, average amount of waste production per resident, percentage of immigrants in Marousi, coverage

of municipal transportation network, number of people using the metro line and one fill in the blank question for the current mayor's name.

The left and right placement questions asked participants to correctly place the two main parties: Pasok and New Democracy as well as all six candidates on a 0 to 10 scale, where 0 was left and 10 was right. Responses were scored as correct if they were on the correct side of the scale and incorrect if they were at the midpoint or on the wrong side of the scale (or were not answered).

The third category of information question asked respondents to correctly place candidates' positions on the issues on a 0 to 10 scale. There were four issue placements questions: *protecting the environment*, (where 0 was that the Marousi government should lead environmental efforts and 10 that they should be led by the national government or individuals); *fighting unemployment* (where 0 was that the Marousi government should hire more people and 10 was the promotion of private sector job creation); *improving local transportation* (where 0 was build more and better roads and 10 was investing in more public transportation); and *integrating immigrants* (where 0 was helping immigrants integrate and 10 was that immigrants should integrate on their own). On all the issue scales, a response was coded correct if it was on the correct side of the scale and incorrect if it was at the midpoint or on the wrong side (or if the respondent did not answer).

All three sorts of information questions showed significant gains. The largest gains were in the issue placement of candidates (the per cent correct on an index of the four issue questions rose from 17.6% to 34.2%) a gain of nearly 17 points. Our hope was that the small group discussions and plenary sessions questioning the candidates would focus on the candidates' positions on the issues. This result confirms this expectation.

(Insert Table 4 about here)

In order to explore the relationship between information and candidate evaluation, the following model was used: <sup>5</sup>

$$P_3 - P_1 = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 K_3 + \gamma_2 (P_1 - G_1) + \varepsilon,$$

where  $P$  represents the participant's positions before deliberation (time 1) and after deliberation (time 3),  $K$  is the participant's knowledge score at time 3,  $G$  is the mean position of the participant's small group at time 1 (excluding the participant), and  $\varepsilon$  is error. <sup>6</sup> Previously, we have argued that the best measure of true information gain is actually the post-deliberation knowledge score. If one makes three plausible assumptions: a) that there will be ceiling effects (so that those with high scores at time 1 cannot register their information gains with T3-T1 knowledge b) that the "rich get richer" meaning that those who are high in knowledge will likely gain more and c) there is what might be called "item sampling bias" in that useful knowledge questions have to be relatively easy to show gains, it can be shown that these three conditions together imply that the post deliberation knowledge scores will more reliably represent true information gain than will the change in scores. (see Luskin et al 2002 and Luskin 2001 for a more detailed discussion.)

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<sup>5</sup> This analysis follows Luskin et al, "Considered Opinions" pp. 480-83.

<sup>6</sup> Variables are implicitly subscripted for the  $i$ th participant and  $j$ th project index.

In the analysis that follows we use the third category of information question, the placing of candidates on issue scales. It was this sort of knowledge that most directly related to the task before the participants—evaluating the candidates. The knowledge index for each candidate consists of issue placements questions for that candidate only, i.e. the knowledge index for Alexandris consists of Alexandris’ four issue placement questions (protecting the environment, fighting unemployment, improving local transportation and integrating immigrants) that participants were asked to place correctly. Table 5 reports the knowledge gains for the candidate-specific knowledge indices. (Insert Table 5 about here)

In applying this model, we look to see if the coefficient of  $K3$  has the same sign as  $P3 - P1$ . If so, that shows that those with more knowledge are causing the overall opinion change. The coefficient of  $P1 - G1$  should have a negative sign, because the participants’ opinions can be expected to move closer to their small groups’ opinions.

This information driven model was applied to all six candidates. Four of six candidates had significant overall opinion changes; opinion change for Karanasou was at the .05 level, while opinion change for Alexandris, Diakoliou and Breyiannis was at the .01 level. For the four candidates showing significant opinion change, the coefficients for  $K3$  and  $P1 - G1$  met the above expectations.

Overall opinion change for Alexandris, Diakoliou, Karanasou and Breyiannis is positive and the coefficient of  $K3$  is positive and significant for all candidates, except for Karanasou. The small group coefficients for all six candidates are negative, which shows that participants’ opinions are becoming closer to the opinions of their small groups. To further examine this negative coefficient, the small group variable can be analyzed as separate regressors. These results show the negative coefficient of the small group variable comes from  $P1$ , and not  $G1$ , which means that that such movement is probably just regression toward the mean. In sum, the information driven model demonstrates that participants with more knowledge are driving overall opinion changes.

(Insert Table 6 about here)

### **From Poll to Ballot Box: Choosing a Candidate**

After the participants in the Deliberative Poll filled out their final questionnaires, they went into a “polling booth” and voted, by secret ballot, to choose a candidate for the mayoral nomination. The ground rules specified that if no candidate got a majority, there would be a run-off between the top two contenders.

The top two candidates were Alexandris and Breyiannis, Alexandris received 41.6 percent and Breyiannis received 20.8 percent. With neither candidate receiving an absolute majority, a second round of voting took place by secret ballot. Alexandris won the second round with 57.5 percent and Breyiannis had 42.5 percent.

(Insert Table 7 about here)

Since Round II, as reported in Table 7, was completed through secret ballots, the only way to determine how participants voted is through projecting participants’ vote intention. Can we explain the voting intentions in the actual candidate selection with data

gathered in the Deliberative Poll? Do the actual votes represent the sort of deliberative opinions suggested by the final deliberative poll questionnaire results?

A combination of variables was used to construct participants' Round II vote intention. First, from the post-deliberation questionnaire, participants' actual vote intention was used. The voting intention question asked participants to select their mayoral nominee among the six candidates. The number of votes for the two runoff candidates was Alexandris with 43 votes and Breyiannis with 21 votes; these candidates also received the highest number of votes among the six candidates. This voting intention question yielded 64 votes. Since the participants' N=138, the feeling thermometer ratings, from the same questionnaire, for Alexandris and Breyiannis were used. Here, a feeling thermometer rating of 50 (out of 100) or above for a candidate earned the candidate a vote. From this projection, a total of 43 votes were assigned – 28 votes to Alexandris and 15 votes to Breyiannis. The correlation between actual vote intention and this projected vote intention is 1.00. The feeling thermometer ratings were unable to predict the vote intention for the remaining 31 votes, because some participants did not specify a rating for either or both candidates, or their ratings were tied.

Finally, to assign these remaining votes, a logit regression was used to generate projection coefficients. For this regression, the dependent variable was the actual vote intention from the post-deliberation (T3) questionnaire. There were 13 explanatory variables: feeling thermometer ratings for 6 candidates at time 2 (arrival pre-deliberation questionnaire), knowledge index using 6 candidates' issue placements, and interaction variables between the feeling thermometer ratings and the knowledge index for 6 candidates. The coefficients were applied to the relevant scores for each participant and subsequently, if a candidate's probability was greater than 0.5, Alexandris received the vote, and if the probability was less than 0.5, Breyiannis received the vote. The distribution of these 31 votes was 26 votes for Alexandris and 5 votes for Breyiannis. The correlation between actual vote intention and this projected vote intention, using regression coefficients is .63. This correlation cannot compare to the perfect correlation between actual vote intention and the use of feeling thermometer ratings to predict vote intention. Therefore, the subsequent analyses are replicated for two versions of the predicted vote intention variable: one version without logit projections, N =107, referred to as Predicted Vote Intention I and a second version with logit projections, N=138, referred to as Predicted Vote Intention II.

(Insert Table 8 about here)

With participants' vote intention, a model can be used to examine the runoff election between Alexandris and Breyiannis. In voting studies around the world, candidate traits or issues of character tend to be the most powerful determinant of voting. We wanted to see what role the issues and information might play in post deliberation voting preferences.<sup>7</sup> For this model, five explanatory variables were used. First, a Traits Index, which was composed of three candidate traits: "sincere", "intelligent" and "likeable". Participants were asked to indicate whether these three traits described each

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<sup>7</sup> For an overview and somewhat parallel result see Iyengar, Luskin and Fishkin 2005. In a presidential primary Deliberative Poll candidate traits were of overwhelming importance among non-deliberators but among deliberators policy also became important.

candidate “extremely well”, “quite well”, “not too well”, or “not well at all”. The index was constructed as an average of Alexandris’ traits minus an average of Breyiannis’ traits. The second explanatory variable utilized four issue placement questions: protecting the environment, fighting unemployment, improving local transportation, and integrating immigrants. The Euclidean distance was calculated for the respondents’ and the candidates’ position on these issue questions. The index was constructed as an average of the difference between the respondents’ position and Breyiannis’ position on each issue, minus, an average of the difference between the respondents’ position minus Alexandris’ position on each issue. The Knowledge Index was the third explanatory variable. For this model, the index was an average of Alexandris’ candidate-specific knowledge index and Breyiannis’ candidate-specific knowledge index. Finally, the last two explanatory variables are interaction variables: Knowledge Index with Traits Index and Knowledge Index with Issues Euclidean Distance Index. All explanatory variables are at time 2.

The regression results, Table 9, for Predicted Vote Intention I and II are very similar. The Traits Index, Issues Index, and interaction between the Knowledge and Issues indices are significant in both regressions, with exception that the latter two indices are less statistically significant in the second regression. These results show “traits”, on its own, has a positive and significant correlation in determining participants’ vote intention. Whereas, “issues” by itself has a negative correlation, but when interacted with knowledge, has a positive and significant correlation.  
(Insert Table 9 about here)

Hence we can see that the deliberative process extended from Deliberative Poll to voting booth. The final considered judgments in the DP carried, as one would hope, into the official decision. But should we consider this process the deliberative analogue to an open or closed candidate selection process. It was officially open to all voters but participation came primarily from PASOK supporters. First, it is worth noting that unlike other Deliberative Polls, no incentives were paid. The ancient Athenian analogue compensated participants for their work of citizenship and perhaps this might be considered in future iterations. But even given this limitation, it is worth noting that the result was the same, whether one considers only PASOK supporters or considers the whole electorate. As pictured in table 10, the same choice, Alexandris, emerges, with PASOK voters only or with all voters represented. So when considered as a deliberative decision by party supporters, the process fares well. When considered as a deliberative decision by the whole electorate, the process leads so far as we know to the same result, but we face the question that without incentives, additional participation was limited.  
(Insert Table 10 about here)

## **Conclusion**

The Marousi project aspired to revive a form of deliberative democracy once common in Athens but not practiced there to make actual decisions since ancient times. It aspired to apply this form of democracy to the distinctly modern problem of choosing a

candidate for a major political party. The criteria proposed here—political equality and deliberation suggest evaluations in terms of representativeness and in terms of the effects of information and policy on the choice. From this perspective, the project, while far from perfect, was reasonably successful. Whether viewed as an open or closed deliberative analogue to the primary, the DP offered a good microcosm of the policy attitudes of the relevant population. As Mill argued in Representative Government, any citizen whose views were shared by a significant number should be able to see his views represented in the microcosm--his arguments offered and answered by others with different points of view. The resulting conclusions, if it is a deliberative microcosm should come not as “a mere act of will” but on the basis of “the better argument.” (Mill, 1890).

From this perspective the role of information explicated here clearly offers some reassurance that informed preferences were influencing candidate choice. Of course the deliberators were also influenced by candidate traits. This is to be expected after a single day of deliberation. And indeed it is arguable that questions of character are essential for the public to have trust in those they elect (a classic modern case for considering character in elections can be found in Barber 1972).

The fact that there is a clear basis for connecting the final Deliberative Poll results with the secret ballots in the official choice also shows that the deliberative process applied to a case of binding decisions. While we would contest the claim that all applications of deliberative democracy need to be binding rather than advisory (a claim put forward by Gutmann and Thompson 2004), this particular application clearly lives up to that criterion since the microcosm was, in effect, the official selectorate of the party’s candidate. There are plans for the party to continue applying this institutional design to other candidate selections. The initial evaluation here provides support for such an undertaking.

After the candidate selection, Papandreou said to the press that this process “strengthened democratic procedures not only in Greece but on a world level as well”. He added “We want to transfer this experience to many parts of the world...and to use it in other cities (of the country) and for different issues.”<sup>8</sup>

However, the PASOK candidate did not, in the end, carry the day. In the general election, the incumbent mayor, a former PASOK member, supported a protégé who ran as an independent, splitting the PASOK vote and the New Democracy candidate, Georgios Patoylis narrowly defeated Alexandris. Despite this later defeat, the candidate selection process itself demonstrated the viability of a new process which, hopefully, can be spread as Papandreou envisaged.

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<sup>8</sup> “Papandreou hails procedure for naming PASOK candidate” Athens News Agency (June 6, 2006) available at <http://www.hri.org/news/greek/ana/2006/06-06-05.ana.html>

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**Table 1: Representativeness, Non-participants and Participants**

	<b>Non-participants</b>	<b>Participants</b>	<b>Sig.</b>
<b>Partisan Affiliation (%)</b>			
2004 Vote Choice (% of Pasok Voters)	27.63%	67.97%	p<.01
Intention to Vote in October	91.8%	96.73%	p<.05
<b>Demographics</b>			
Gender (% of Females)	66.76%	43.79%	p<.01
Education (5 Categories)	4.35	4.63	n.s.
Age	49.16 years	52.42 years	p<.05
Occupation			
<i>Self-Employed</i>	11.11%	11.84%	n.s.
<i>Public Employee</i>	13.71%	15.13%	n.s.
<i>Private Employee</i>	22.49%	25.66%	n.s.
<i>Unemployed</i>	5.11%	5.92%	n.s.
<i>Student</i>	2.63%	6.63%	p<.05
<i>Housewife</i>	14.25%	5.26%	p<.01
<i>Retired</i>	26.7%	33.55%	n.s.
Marital Status (% of Singles without Children)	21.58%	14.38%	p<.05
Number of Children	1.26	1.49	p<.01
Number of Children under 18	.52	.56	n.s.
Household Income (6-point Scale)	3.45	3.77	p<.05
Church Attendance (5-point Scale)	2.86	2.66	p<.05
Number of Years in Living in Maroussi	26.58	27.29	n.s.
<b>Issue Priorities (0-10 Scale)</b>			
Municipal waste management	9.00	8.88	n.s.
Maintenance of public roads	8.98	8.85	n.s.
Tackling unemployment	8.42	8.06	n.s.
Reducing poverty	8.10	7.67	n.s.
Improving public transport	8.27	8.24	n.s.
Organized Parking	6.83	6.75	n.s.

The Mall	4.84	4.48	n.s.
The operation of multinational companies based in Marousi	4.62	4.36	n.s.
The integration of immigrants into society	6.43	7.03	p<.05
Public accountability of elected officials in the municipality	8.34	8.35	n.s.
Expanding public participation	8.04	8.07	n.s.
The transparency in management of public funds	8.85	9.19	n.s.
Long term municipal budgets	7.07	6.99	n.s.
Building new municipal sports venues	7.64	7.31	n.s.
Finding open spaces	8.49	8.25	n.s.
The maintenance of public schools	8.60	8.38	n.s.
Managing school budgets	7.34	6.66	p<.01
Instituting a private university in Marousi	5.48	4.80	p<.05
Providing municipal healthcare	8.51	8.34	n.s.

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Note: For Issues Priorities, participants who selected “don’t know” or did not answer were placed at the midpoint.

**Table 2 Representativeness, Pasok Participants and Pasok Non-participants**

	Non-participants	Participants	Sig.
<b>Demographics</b>			
Gender (% of Females)	66.13%	43.27%	p<.01
Education (5 Categories)	4.20	4.59	n.s.
Age	50.77 years	53.44 years	n.s.
<b>Occupation</b>			
<i>Self-Employed</i>	10.0%	10.6%	n.s.
<i>Public Employee</i>	15.2%	17.3%	n.s.
<i>Private Employee</i>	21.9%	24.0%	n.s.
<i>Unemployed</i>	4.2%	6.7%	n.s.
<i>Student</i>	3.9%	1.9%	n.s.
<i>Housewife</i>	12.6%	3.9%	p<.01
<i>Retired</i>	31.9%	34.6%	n.s.
Marital Status (% of Singles without Children)	19.48%	11.54%	n.s.
Number of Children	1.30	1.51	n.s.
Number of Children under 18	.55	.53	n.s.
Household Income (6-point Scale)	3.47	3.74	n.s.
Church Attendance (5-point Scale)	3.29	3.43	n.s.
Number of Years in Living in Maroussi	27.25	27.45	n.s.
<b>Issue Priorities (0-10 Scale)</b>			
Municipal waste management	9.13	8.86	n.s.
Maintenance of public roads	9.01	8.82	n.s.
Tackling unemployment	8.76	8.21	p<.05
Reducing poverty	8.45	7.84	p<.05
Improving public transport	8.30	8.39	n.s.
Organized Parking	7.06	6.90	n.s.
The Mall	4.97	4.61	n.s.
The operation of multinational companies based in Marousi	4.61	4.42	n.s.
The integration of immigrants into society	6.87	7.21	n.s.
Public accountability of elected officials in the municipality	8.48	8.41	n.s.
Expanding public participation	8.24	8.09	n.s.
The transparency in management of public funds	8.97	9.05	n.s.
Long term municipal budgets	7.12	7.11	n.s.
Building new municipal sports venues	7.65	7.51	n.s.
Finding open spaces	8.60	8.14	p<.10
The maintenance of public schools	8.86	8.55	n.s.
Managing school budgets	7.67	6.86	p<.01

Instituting a private university in Marousi	5.42	5.10	n.s.
Providing municipal healthcare	8.78	8.51	n.s.

Note: For Issues Priorities, participants who selected “don’t know” or did not answer were placed at the midpoint.

**Table 3: Feeling Thermometer Ratings**

Candidate	Pre: Feeling Thermometer	Post: Feeling Thermometer	T2-T1 Change	% “never heard of candidate” or “no answer” pre-deliberations
Alexandris	48.1	62.6	+14.5 <sup>b</sup>	84.0
Veloudos	41.6	40.7	-0.9	77.9
Vlachos	43.7	41.8	-1.9	65.7
Diakoliou	42.9	51.2	+8.3 <sup>b</sup>	75.1
Karansou	43.6	49.0	+5.5 <sup>a</sup>	81.6
Breyiannis	49.1	56.7	+7.6 <sup>b</sup>	77.4

Note: <sup>a</sup>p<.05, <sup>b</sup>p<.01. Numbers presented are means unless otherwise noted. Feeling Thermometer scale is 0 to 100, where 100 is highest. Participants who selected “don’t know” or did not answer were placed at 50, the midpoint.

**Table 4: Knowledge Gains**

<b>Knowledge Questions (% correct)</b>	<b>Pre</b>	<b>Post</b>	<b>Change</b>	<b>Sig.</b>
Factual	39.4	42.8	+3.3	.017
Left/Right Placements of Parties & Candidates	24.7	36.3	+11.6	.000
Issue Placements of Candidates	17.6	34.2	+16.6	.000

Note: Participants who selected “don’t know” or did not answer were considered incorrect answers.

**Table 5: Knowledge Gains: Candidate-Specific Indices**

<b>Candidate (% correct)</b>	<b>Pre</b>	<b>Post</b>	<b>Change</b>	<b>Sig.</b>
Alexandris	25.6	42.3	+16.7	.000
Veloudos	16.7	34.5	+17.9	.000
Vlachos	19.0	35.9	+16.8	.000
Diakoliou	21.7	37.6	+15.9	.000
Karansou	20.8	37.9	+17.1	.000
Breyiannis	20.8	40.9	+20.1	.000

**Table 6: Attitude Change as a Function of T<sub>3</sub> Information, T<sub>1</sub> Small Group Mean and T<sub>1</sub> Attitude  
Dependent Variable: T3-T1 Thermometer Rating**

	Alexandris (+) <sup>c</sup>	Veloudos (-)	Vlachos (-)	Diakoliou (+) <sup>c</sup>	Karanasou (+) <sup>b</sup>	Breyiannis (+) <sup>c</sup>
Intercept	3.063 (3.586)	-.347 (3.036)	-3.080 (3.210)	3.276 (3.742)	4.959 <sup>a</sup> (3.581)	.698 (3.545)
T <sub>3</sub> Information †	24.964 <sup>c</sup> (6.684)	-2.153 (6.448)	2.367 (7.014)	15.275 <sup>b</sup> (7.725)	.222 (7.284)	19.184 <sup>c</sup> (6.907)
R's distance from T <sub>1</sub> group mean ‡	-.417 <sup>c</sup> (.103)	-.674 <sup>c</sup> (.095)	-.454 <sup>c</sup> (.088)	-.475 <sup>c</sup> (.096)	-.471 <sup>c</sup> (.099)	-.486 <sup>c</sup> (.085)
adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	.156	.279	.163	.154	.141	.208
F	12.83	25.82	13.46	12.64	11.52	17.80
Probability	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
n	129	129	129	129	129	129

Note: Cell entries are coefficient estimates with estimated standard errors in parentheses. The parenthetical signs in the column headings indicate the direction of net change for the sample as a whole and thus the expected sign of the information coefficient.

† T<sub>3</sub> information is the mean of candidate specific absolute issue placements.

‡ The group mean variables are calculated on the *other* group members, excluding the respondent.

p-values are one-tailed; <sup>a</sup>Significant at the 0.10 level; <sup>b</sup> Significant at the 0.05 level; <sup>c</sup>Significant at the 0.01 level

**Table 7: Round I & Round II Results**

<b>Candidate</b>	<b>Round I %</b>	<b>Round II %</b>
Alexandris	41.6	57.5
Breyiannis	20.8	42.5
Karansou	12.8	
Diakoliou	12.0	
Vlachos	9.6	
Veloudos	3.2	

Round I is the first secret ballot and round II is the run off.

**Table 8: Predicted Vote Intention**

<b>Runoff Candidate</b>	<b>Alexandris</b>	<b>Breyiannis</b>	<b>Total</b>
Actual Vote Intention	43	21	64
Vote Intention from Feeling Thermometer Ratings	28	15	43
Vote Intention from Logit Projections	26	5	31
<b>Total</b>	<b>97</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>138</b>

**Table 9: Mayoral Runoff: Logistic Regression Results**

Explanatory Variables	Predicted Vote Intention I	S.E.	Predicted Vote Intention II	S.E.
Traits	8.044 <sup>c</sup>	2.388	8.414 <sup>c</sup>	2.323
Issues Euclidean Distance	-0.444 <sup>b</sup>	0.205	-0.353 <sup>a</sup>	0.193
Knowledge	1.691	1.266	0.973	1.019
Interaction Variable: Knowledge & Traits	-4.973	5.659	-4.798	4.85
Interaction Variable: Knowledge & Issues Euclidean Distance	1.307 <sup>b</sup>	0.671	0.877 <sup>a</sup>	0.518
Constant	0.707	0.319	1.051 <sup>c</sup>	0.289
LR $X^2$	43.630		47.250	
Prob > $X^2$	0.000		0.000	
Pseudo $R^2$	0.319		0.281	
Log likelihood	-46.521		-60.333	
N	107		138	

Note: <sup>a</sup>p<.10, <sup>b</sup>p<.05, <sup>c</sup>p<.01. Participants who selected “don’t know” or did not answer were placed at the midpoint.

**Table 10: Voting Intention on Arrival and Post-deliberation, Comparing Participants who did and did not vote for the PASOK Party in 2004**

Candidates	Voting Intention (%)			
	On Arrival - Participants who <u>voted</u> for the <i>PASOK</i> Party in 2004	On Arrival - Participants who <u>did not vote</u> for the <i>PASOK</i> Party in 2004	Post-deliberation - Participants who <u>voted</u> for the <i>PASOK</i> Party in 2004	Post-deliberation - Participants who <u>did not vote</u> for the <i>PASOK</i> Party in 2004
Alexandris	30.43	6.90	41.46	31.03
Veloudos	2.90	0.00	0.00	6.90
Vlachos	17.39	20.69	6.10	13.79
Diakoliou	10.14	24.14	15.85	10.34
Karansou	14.49	20.69	13.41	31.03
Breyiannis	24.64	27.59	23.17	6.90